Some Comments

I have quoted the CHOICE Asset Management Team before. I will try to not do it too much given how sarcastic they tend to be, but I thought the following comments were fitting.

"The 5.4 billion share Citigroup offering designed to repay TARP did not go particularly well for taxpayers, who actually came out of the botched secondary (was priced 20% below prevailing prices the day prior to the deal’s announcement, pushing the offering below the government’s $3.25 cost and thwarting plans to sell 1 billion of our shares) with more restrictions on our stock than we had going in (can’t sell for 90 days, and don’t forget that our common-share stake originally came in the form of a more-senior interest-bearing preferred). We still own 7.7 billion shares (“down” from a 34% to a 27% stake in the company due to the share dilution), but the bank that never sleeps can pay bonuses in 2010 now, hoo-ray!"

"The IRS and Treasury did what they could to help the deal, by giving it an exception for longstanding change-of-ownership rules that “would have” eliminated the value of Citi’s $38 billion of tax loss carry-forwards. Didn’t Mr. Obama just a week ago say something about getting tough on “fat cat bankers”? (Recall that C employs 46 full time lobbyists, more than any other company – Mr. “Whatever it takes” Geithner may have missed 60 Minutes that night.)"

"Today Bloomberg is running a story mentioning that C shares need to at least triple by 2018 for the warrants that taxpayers own to have any value (we own 255 million warrants to buy stock at $10.61/share and another 210 million at $17.85/share). The latter would give it a half-trillion market capitalization, more than what any US bank has ever achieved."

"We should note that Wells Fargo’s $10.7 billion offering appeared to go off without a hitch (and probably contributed to buyer indigestion for Citi), allowing it to repay its $25 billion loan from taxpayers."

"That occurred even as Citigoup and Wells Fargo repaid their respective $20 and $25 billion TARP borrowings to the US Treasury (taxpayers)."

"Positive as that is, we hope Americans can see through officials’ curious assessment that TARP has been “profitable,” since taxpayer “investments” in AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac (among others) have expanded, rather than contracted. In referring to TARP “profits,” officials are ignoring unrealized losses on AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Using the same logic, an investor might declare his or her portfolio to be “profitable,” provided they excluded underwater positions they still own in their portfolio."

"The Treasury announced it is lifting its $400 billion cap to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and now will provide “unlimited” support, likely signaling that mortgage losses are set to grow in 2010. Treasury said its announcement “should leave no uncertainty about Treasury’s commitment to support these firms as they continue to play a vital role in the housing market during this current crisis.”

"The same day, Fannie and Freddie announced its chief executives would receive $6 million in remuneration for 2009, a year in which both firms lost billions of dollars and required taxpayer support to remain solvent."

"Was the timing of these announcements on Christmas Eve merely a coincidence, or was the timing strategically designed so that the news would get “lost” over a long weekend, in which Americans were focused on family, friends, and the holiday season? You know the answer."

"Does anyone recognize that Treasury is conducting fiscal policy, which once (see Article 1, Section 7 of the US Constitution) was thought to be Congress’ responsibility?"

IRAN

This very long, but important, article makes me feel warm and cozy all over. (Insert dripping sarcasm graphic here).

The Iranian Incursion in Context
By George Friedman

A small number of Iranian troops entered Iraq, where they took control of an oil well and raised the Iranian flag Dec. 18. The Iranian-Iraqi border in this region is poorly defined and is contested, with the Iranians claiming this well is in Iranian territory not returned after the Iran-Iraq War. Such incidents have occurred in the past. Given that there were no casualties this time, it therefore would be easy to dismiss this incident, even though at about the same time an Iranian official claimed that Iraq owes Iran about $1 trillion in reparations for starting the Iran-Iraq War.

But what would be fairly trivial at another time and place is not trivial now.

Sending a Message With an Incursion
Multiple sources have reported that Tehran ordered the incident. The Iranian government is aware that Washington has said the end of 2009 was to be the deadline for taking action against Iran over its nuclear program — and that according to a White House source, the United States could extend that deadline to Jan. 15, 2010.

That postponement makes an important point. The United States has treated the Iran crisis as something that will be handled on an American timeline. The way that the Obama administration handled the Afghanistan strategy review suggests it assumes that Washington controls the tempo of events sufficiently that it can make decisions carefully, deliberately and with due reflection. If true, that would mean that adversaries like Iran are purely on the defensive, and either have no counter to American moves or cannot counter the United States until after Washington makes its next move.

For Iran, just to accept that premise puts it at an obvious disadvantage. First, Tehran would have to demonstrate that the tempo of events is not simply in American or Israeli hands. Second, Tehran would have to remind the United States and Israel that Iran has options that it might use regardless of whether the United States chooses sanctions or war. Most important, Iran must show that whatever these options are, they can occur before the United States acts — that Iran has axes of its own, and may not wait for the U.S. axe to fall.

The incursion was shaped to make this point without forcing the United States into precipitous action. The location was politically ambiguous. The force was small. Casualties were avoided. At the same time, it was an action that snapped a lot of people to attention. Oil prices climbed. Baghdad and Washington scrambled to try to figure what was going on, and for a while Washington was clearly at a loss, driving home the fact that the United States doesn’t always respond quickly and efficiently to surprises initiated by the other side.

The event eventually died down, and the Iranians went out of their way to minimize its importance. But two points nevertheless were made. The first was that Iran might not wait for Washington to consider all possible scenarios. The second was that the Iranians know how to raise oil prices. And with that lesson, they reminded the Americans that the Iranians have a degree of control over the economic recovery in the United States.

There has never been any doubt that Iran has options in the event that the United States chooses to strike. Significantly, the Iranians now have driven home that they might initiate a conflict if they assume conflict is inevitable.

U.S. and Iranian Options
Iran’s problem becomes clear when we consider Tehran’s options. These options fall into three groups:
1. Interdicting the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf through the use of mines and anti-ship missiles. This would result in a dramatic increase in world oil prices on the Iranian attempt alone and could keep them high if Tehran’s efforts succeeded. The impact on the global economy would be substantial.

2. Causing massive destabilization in Iraq. The Iranians retain allies and agents in Iraq, which has been experiencing increased violence and destabilization over the past months. As the violence increases and the Americans leave, a close relationship with Iran might be increasingly attractive to Iraqi troops. Given the deployment of American troops, direct attacks in Iraq by Iranian forces are not out of the question. Even if ultimately repulsed, such Iranian incursions could further destabilize Iraq. This would force the Obama administration to reconsider the U.S. withdrawal timetable, potentially affecting Afghanistan.

3. Use Hezbollah to initiate a conflict with Israel, and as a global tool for terrorist attacks on American and allied targets. Hezbollah is far more sophisticated and effective than al Qaeda was at its height, and would be a formidable threat should Iran choose — and Hezbollah agree — to play this role.

When we look at the three Iranian options, it is clear that the United States would not be able to confine any action against Iran to airstrikes. The United States is extremely good at air campaigns, while it is weak at counterinsurgency. It has massive resources in the region to throw into an air campaign and it can bring more in using carrier strike groups.

But even before hitting Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Americans would have to consider the potential Iranian responses. Washington would have to take three steps. First, Iranian anti-ship missiles and surface vessels — and these vessels could be very small but still able to carry out mine warfare — on the Iranian littoral would have to be destroyed. Second, large formations of Iranian troops along the Iraqi border would have to be attacked, and Iranian assets in Iraq at the very least disrupted. Finally, covert actions against Hezbollah assets — particularly assets outside Lebanon — would have to be neutralized to the extent possible.

This would require massive, coordinated attacks, primarily using airpower and covert forces in a very tight sequence prior to any attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Without this, Iran would be in a position to launch the attacks outlined above in response to strikes on its nuclear facilities. Given the nature of the Iranian responses, particularly the mining of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, the operations could be carried out quickly and with potentially devastating results to the global economy.

From the Iranian standpoint, Tehran faces a “use-it-or-lose-it” scenario. It cannot wait until the United States initiates hostilities. The worst-case scenario for Iran is waiting for Washington to initiate the conflict.

At the same time, the very complexity of an Iranian attack makes the United States want to think long and hard before attacking Iran. The opportunities for failure are substantial, no matter how well the attack is planned. And the United States can’t allow Israel to start a conflict with Iran alone because Israel lacks the resources to deal with a subsequent Iranian naval interdiction and disruptions in Iraq.

It follows that the United States is interested in a nonmilitary solution to the problem. The ideal solution would be sanctions on gasoline. The United States wants to take as much time as needed to get China and Russia committed to such sanctions.

Iranian Pre-emption
The Iranians signaled last week that they might not choose to be passive if effective sanctions were put in place. Sanctions on gasoline would in fact cripple Iran, so like Japan prior to Pearl Harbor, the option of capitulating to sanctions might be viewed as more risky than a pre-emptive strike. And if sanctions didn’t work, the Iranians would have to assume a military attack is coming next. Since the Iranians wouldn’t know when it would happen, and their retaliatory options might disappear in the first phase of the military operation, they would need to act before such an attack.

The problem is that the Iranians won’t know precisely when that attack will take place. The United States and Israel have long discussed a redline in Iranian nuclear development, which if approached would force an attack on Iran to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Logically, Iran would seem to have a redline as well, equally poorly designed. At the point when it becomes clear that sanctions are threatening regime survival or that military action is inevitable, Iran must act first, using its military assets before it loses them.

Iran cannot live with either effective sanctions or the type of campaign that the United States would have to launch to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities. The United States can’t live with the consequences of Iranian counteractions to an attack. Even if sanctions were possible, they would leave Iran with the option to do precisely those things Washington cannot tolerate. Therefore, whether the diplomatic or military route is followed, each side has two options. First, the Americans can accept Iran as a nuclear power, or Iran can accept that it must give up its nuclear ambitions. Second, assuming that neither side accepts the first option, each side must take military action before the other side does. The Americans must neutralize counters before the Iranians deploy them. The Iranians must deploy their counters before they are destroyed.
The United States and Iran are both playing for time. Neither side wants to change its position on the nuclear question, although each hopes the other will give in. Moreover, neither side is really confident in its military options. The Americans are not certain that they can both destroy the nuclear facilities and Iranian counters — and if the counters are effective, their consequences could be devastating. The Iranians are not certain that their counters will work effectively, and once failure is established, the Iranians will be wide open for devastating attack. Each side assumes the other understands the risks and will accept the other’s terms for a settlement.

And so each waits, hoping the other side will back down. The events of the past week were designed to show the Americans that Iran is not prepared to back down. More important, they were designed to show that the Iranians also have a redline, that it is as fuzzy as the American redline and that the Americans should be very careful in how far they press, as they might suddenly wake up one morning with their hands full.

The Iranian move is deliberately designed to rattle U.S. President Barack Obama. He has shown a decision-making style that assumes that he is not under time pressure to make decisions. It is not clear to anyone what his decision-making style in a crisis will look like. Though not a prime consideration from the Iranian point of view, putting Obama in a position where he is psychologically unprepared for decisions in the timeframe they need to be made in is certainly an added benefit. Iran, of course, doesn’t know how effectively he might respond, but his approach to Afghanistan gives them another incentive to act sooner than later.

There are some parallels here to the nuclear warfare theory, in which each side faces mutual assured destruction. The problem here is that each side does not face destruction, but pain. And here, pre-emptive strikes are not guaranteed to produce anything. It is the vast unknowns that make this affair so dangerous, and at any moment, one side or the other might decide they can wait no longer.

"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

Stimulus

My brother-in-law Tom made a comment on my last post that I totally agree with and have also been wondering for a while. His point was, how come none of our representatives seem to remember Econ 101? Further we can ask, why is it they don't seem to pay attention to any of the current studies? You would think that at the very least one of their many aides would have read something that completely contradicts what they are working on.

I think that this article from Greg Mankiw is yet another example of something you hope that our representatives read and, more importantly, take into consideration as they are looking at policy changes.

Tax Cuts Might Accomplish What Spending Hasn’t
By N. GREGORY MANKIW

IMAGINE you are a physician and a patient arrives in your office with a troubling and mysterious disease. Some of the symptoms are familiar, but others are not. You have never treated anyone with quite this set of problems.

Based on your training and experience, imperfect as it is, you come up with a proposed remedy. The patient leaves with a prescription in hand. You hope and pray that it works.
A week later, however, the patient comes back and the symptoms are, in some ways, worse. What do you do now? You have three options:

STAY THE COURSE Perhaps the patient was sicker than you thought, and it will take longer for your remedy to kick in.

UP THE DOSAGE Perhaps the remedy was right but the quantity was wrong. The patient might need more medicine.

RETHINK THE REMEDY Perhaps the treatment you prescribed wasn’t right after all. Maybe a different mixture of medicines would work better.

Choosing among these three reasonable courses of action is not easy. In many ways, the Obama administration faces a similar situation right now.

When President Obama was elected, the economy was sick and getting sicker. Before he was even in office in January, his economic team released a report on the problem.
If nothing was done, the report said, the unemployment rate would keep rising, reaching 9 percent in early 2010. But if the nation embarked on a fiscal stimulus of $775 billion, mainly in the form of increased government spending, the unemployment rate was predicted to stay under 8 percent.

In fact, the Congress passed a sizable fiscal stimulus. Yet things turned out worse than the White House expected. The unemployment rate is now 10 percent — a full percentage point above what the administration economists said would occur without any stimulus.
To be sure, there are some positive signs, like reduced credit spreads, gross domestic product growth and diminishing job losses. But the recovery is not yet as robust as the president and his economic team had originally hoped.

So what to do now? The administration seems most intent on staying the course, although in a speech Tuesday, the president showed interest in upping the dosage. The better path, however, might be to rethink the remedy.

When devising its fiscal package, the Obama administration relied on conventional economic models based in part on ideas of John Maynard Keynes. Keynesian theory says that government spending is more potent than tax policy for jump-starting a stalled economy.

The report in January put numbers to this conclusion. It says that an extra dollar of government spending raises G.D.P. by $1.57, while a dollar of tax cuts raises G.D.P. by only 99 cents. The implication is that if we are going to increase the budget deficit to promote growth and jobs, it is better to spend more than tax less.

But various recent studies suggest that conventional wisdom is backward.
One piece of evidence comes from Christina D. Romer, the chairwoman of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers. In work with her husband, David H. Romer, written at the University of California, Berkeley, just months before she took her current job, Ms. Romer found that tax policy has a powerful influence on economic activity.

According to the Romers, each dollar of tax cuts has historically raised G.D.P. by about $3 — three times the figure used in the administration report. That is also far greater than most estimates of the effects of government spending.

Other recent work supports the Romers’ findings. In a December 2008 working paper, Andrew Mountford of the University of London and Harald Uhlig of the University of Chicago apply state-of-the-art statistical tools to United States data to compare the effects of deficit-financed spending, deficit-financed tax cuts and tax-financed spending. They report that “deficit-financed tax cuts work best among these three scenarios to improve G.D.P.”

My Harvard colleagues Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna have recently conducted a comprehensive analysis of the issue. In an October study, they looked at large changes in fiscal policy in 21 nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. They identified 91 episodes since 1970 in which policy moved to stimulate the economy. They then compared the policy interventions that succeeded — that is, those that were actually followed by robust growth — with those that failed.

The results are striking. Successful stimulus relies almost entirely on cuts in business and income taxes. Failed stimulus relies mostly on increases in government spending.

All these findings suggest that conventional models leave something out. A clue as to what that might be can be found in a 2002 study by Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti. (Mr. Perotti is a professor at Boccini University in Milano, Italy; Mr. Blanchard is now chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.) They report that “both increases in taxes and increases in government spending have a strong negative effect on private investment spending. This effect is difficult to reconcile with Keynesian theory.”

These studies point toward tax policy as the best fiscal tool to combat recession, particularly tax changes that influence incentives to invest, like an investment tax credit. Sending out lump-sum rebates, as was done in spring 2008, makes less sense, as it provides little impetus for spending or production.

LIKE our doctor facing a mysterious illness, economists should remain humble and open-minded when considering how best to fix an ailing economy. A growing body of evidence suggests that traditional Keynesian nostrums might not be the best medicine.

Jobs

Now with everyone focused on the jobs front I wanted to share a few of my thoughts as I've read the headlines.

First, I thought that Jobs were supposed to be the focus the whole time? Wasn't that what the point of the second stimulus (the first under President Obama) was for? I thought that was the whole promise of we will create - adding in later the whole bit about saving - millions of jobs in less than a year. That's not to say I am bothered by their sudden turn, again, to the jobs focus, I just found it interesting that some in the media are portraying this as President Obama's first attempt.

Second, I like the points made by John Mauldin in his newsletter:

"In the '50s through the early '80s, recessions were typified by large layoffs at manufacturing businesses, as they had built up too much inventory. Businesses had increased capacity and often borrowed a little too much. Rising prices in the '70s, along with extremely high interest-rate costs, led to the two severe recessions of the early '80s, which Paul Volcker had to essentially force into existence, in order to begin the process of wringing inflation out of the economy.

"But, and this is important, as the economy improved, inventories were eventually worked through and employees were brought back to work. Things returned to normal. The economy would once again grow at a robust rate. Then, in the last two recessions, in the early '90s and early '00s, it took longer for employment to rise. A great part of this was because the manufacturing sector of national employment was becoming an ever smaller part of the economic pie. We were, and still are, turning into an economy driven by services.

"I should note that, on an absolute basis, manufacturing in the US has grown (going back to before this recession started.) We just produced more "stuff" with fewer employees. We became more productive. But this means that there are fewer jobs that will be brought "back" to make up for increasing sales than in past recessions. There are estimates out that as many as 2 million of the 8 million jobs lost are permanent job losses.

"We know that businesses have made large cuts in numbers of employees in order to address lower sales and to increase their profits. Increasing profits by cutting costs even as the "top-line" sales number is shrinking is not a growth strategy that can be sustained. It also eats into research and development and postpones growth."

In other words, if we are going to focus on jobs then we have to do so realistically. If 2 million jobs were permanently lost then how are we going to allow and encourage the creation of 2 million new jobs? We all know that students are currently being prepared for jobs that don't currently exist. There are tons of ideas out there which we don't even know are possibilities at this point.

I think all of this brings up my main point: The real question that government should be asking itself as it tries to come up with ideas on job creation is - In what ways can we get out of the way of job creation in the private sector? I think that they would all do well to read Gallup's World Poll studies on how "Brain Gain" works and more importantly right now (since we are beginning to experience this) how to avoid "Brain Drain."

I am slightly encourage to see some Supply-Side rhetoric coming from President Obama's recent speeches. However, I am not dumb enough to think that the current legislative body will follow through even on the tiniest bit of what could and should happen to get government out of the way. I think that our only hope for new jobs will be for the Legislature to change this coming election.